Control Issues: Binge-watching, channel-surfing and cultural value by Jenner, Mareike
Page 298 
 
. 
           Volume 16, Issue 2     
        November 2019 
 
  
Control Issues: Binge-watching, channel-surfing 
and cultural value 
 
Mareike Jenner, 
Anglia Ruskin University, UK 
 
Abstract: 
This article explores binge-watching as part of neoliberal discourses surrounding control, 
class and ‘good’ television, which leads to an overall discourse concerning the legitimation 
and de-legitimation of the medium. Binge-watching is understood here as part of a 
continuum of viewing practices that help us to understand and discuss the medium in 
popular discourse. As historical precedent, the emphasis lies on channel-surfing to illustrate 
the intersection of technology, control and ‘good’ television. This article outlines some of 
the discourses at stake in channel-surfing and its relationship with remote controls as these 
ancillary technologies move from being devices associated with avoiding ‘bad’ television to 
devices that subjugate viewers. Such a discursive de-legitimation of a viewing practice 
interlinks with an overall de-legitimation of the medium. This precedent is indicative of the 
way binge-watching’s cultural positioning has been negotiated throughout its history and 
may be re-negotiated now, especially in relation to Netflix. The dynamics of this negotiation 
take place at the intersection of class, technology, viewing practices and ‘good’ or ‘quality’ 
television. 
 
 
In the course of promoting The Innocents (Netflix, 2018- ) in 2018, Guy Pearce stated that he 
was instructed by Netflix not to use the term binge-watching. This led to an immense 
amount of press coverage and speculation over company policy. Particularly telling is a 
Yahoo! Finance piece written by Andy Meek (2018) that speculates that the practice of 
binge-watching has become ‘low-brow’ and Netflix is seeking to extricate itself from these 
associations, possibly in advance of launching a more ‘elite’ version of its service in the US. 
Leaving aside speculation about Netflix’s company policy, this episode shows how strongly 
Netflix has managed to become associated with binge-watching. Of course, this association 
was only reinforced by Pearce’s (supposed) gaffe. The practice of binge-watching goes back 
further than Netflix’s existence, but, arguably, it was Netflix more than other companies 
that has ‘mainstreamed’ it (see Jenner 2018, 161-82). When it published its first in-house 
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productions in 2013, the publication model was often as much part of the press coverage as 
the texts themselves (see, for example, Jurgensen 2013, Hale 2013). Binge-watching or what 
was soon called ‘the binge model’ of publishing content quickly became tied to Netflix and 
ensured an intermingling of viewing practice and brand. As much as the association with 
Netflix is an important aspect of the discourse of binge-watching, what is even more 
fascinating is Meek’s discussion of a shift in cultural value linked with the term. He argues 
that binge-watching was long thought of as an ‘elite’ practice, but has since become 
‘everyday,’ mundane, even low-brow. Within the context of American programming and 
usage, this article explores this shift and its links to the history of the medium. 
Binge-watching’s move from ‘elite’ to ‘everyday’ practice is hardly unprecedented 
within television history: channel-surfing and its links with the technologies of cable 
television and, arguably more importantly, the remote control, have gone through a similar 
cycle. The first remote controls that allowed users to change the channel became available 
in 1950 in the US with Zenith’s Lazy Bones (Benson-Allott 2015, 32).1 By 1980, more 
accurate RCDs (Remote Control Devices) that were cheaper to manufacture became 
available (ibid., 81). Additionally, the 1980s saw an extension of available channels and 
remote controls that enabled viewers to switch easily between vast numbers of channels as 
well as between technologies like VCRs and video game consoles. Channel-surfing, or a 
version thereof, was possible before the 1980s and of course is technically possible without 
a remote control. Yet, the RCD arguably helped it to become a common, even necessary, 
media practice to manage an ever-increasing number of TV channels. RCDs were originally 
introduced as a way to subvert commercial television by allowing viewers to change 
channels during ad breaks. More optimistic interpretations viewed them as a way to 
schedule television autonomously (Bellamy and Walker 1996). Nevertheless, in popular 
discourse, RCDs quickly lost their disruptive qualities and became symbols of subjugation 
rather than subversion, as evidenced by cultural stereotypes of the ‘couch potato’ (see Scott 
2016). In other words, as these technologies to control television became more widely 
accessible – even unavoidable as they were included as a matter of course with TV sets, 
VCRs and cable boxes – they became part of the ‘problem’ of television. For binge-watching, 
as the practice has been made widely accessible through Netflix and its comparatively low 
subscription prices, a similar cycle may be repeated.2 Only the initial waves of the cultural 
de-legitimation of binge-watching have been felt, usually in relation to specific texts Netflix 
has released. Yet, considering that this shift in the understanding of new technology is not 
new, questions need to be posed surrounding how current shifts in the cultural value of 
viewing practices and the medium of television may be understood in the context of 
television history.  
This article aims to understand binge-watching and its location within cultural 
discourses by linking it to channel-surfing and its relationship with the RCD. As explained in 
more detail later, the practice of binge-watching became common with the rise of HBO-style 
‘quality’ television in the late 1990s. At the time, it was largely linked with the ancillary 
technology of the DVD player and DVD box sets. Popular among fans and enthusiasts of 
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‘quality’ television, it was Netflix’s streaming service that moved to ‘mainstream’ the 
practice by using it as a guideline for publication models and interface structures (post-play 
and, more recently, skip intro, skip recap). Along with its status as a company and a brand, 
Netflix and its recommendation algorithms are understood here, like the RCD, as an 
ancillary technology that helps to manage television. There are, of course, other online 
platforms that have generated technological innovations that heavily influence 
contemporary television consumption. However, Netflix’s ‘binge-structure’ or structure of 
insulated flow (Perks 2015) in the presentation and publication of serialised dramas and its 
recommendation algorithm (see Finn 2017, 87-111) are particularly relevant here. 
Positioning it as an ancillary technology aligns Netflix with discourses of past ancillary 
technologies and the language of control and choice linked to these technologies and 
associated viewing practices. As Netflix describes itself to investors, ‘Members can play, 
pause and resume watching, all without commercials or commitments’ 
(https://ir.netflix.com/ir-overview/profile/default.aspx), thus embedding itself into 
discourses of self-scheduling as control.  
Both channel-surfing and binge-watching are practices of control linked with 
technologies of control. The term control encapsulates a number of desires, anxieties and 
ambitions of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. A range of cultural analysts and 
philosophers have analysed concepts akin to what Gilles Deleuze (1992) calls ‘control 
societies,’ meaning the control government and private businesses exercise over individuals 
(Harvey 2005, Chun 2006). My focus here is more on the control subjects of control 
societies, like that of neo-liberalism, exercise. Other than in the case of governments or 
private capital, this individual control does not equal power and only pertains to the 
individual’s personal environment. Thus, the control exercised may have a real impact on 
the individual and their immediate environment without having any effect on broader social 
structures or behaviours (see also Jenner 2018, 35-68). This control is framed by ‘narratives 
of self-improvement,’ which posit that the ‘right’ choice of partners, parenting style, living 
space or consumed cultural capital leads to a ‘better’ human being (Salecl 2010). As Michel 
Feher argues:  
 
Insofar as our condition is that of human capital in a neoliberal environment, 
our main purpose is not so much to profit from our accumulated potential as 
to constantly value or appreciate ourselves — or at least prevent our own 
depreciation (2009, 27). 
 
This situation produces dominant narratives of ‘self-improvement’ or, as Feher puts it, ‘self-
appreciation’ to ensure that, even during leisure hours, the neoliberal subject remains 
invested in value-creation. Individuals can increase their own human value by gaining 
control over the culture they consume and the ways in which they themselves are 
consumed.  
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In the context of these narratives, individual viewers can avoid some of the worst 
assumed effects of television by choosing to watch ‘good’ television. Ancillary technologies 
of television allow viewers to ‘better’ themselves by exerting control over the medium and 
watching ‘good’ television. Periods in which new technologies are introduced often coincide 
with periods when discourses of ‘quality’ TV are particularly strong – discourses that not 
only suggest which programmes to watch, but also how to watch them. The period in which 
channel-surfing becomes more common was also the period of series like Hill Street Blues 
(NBC, 1980-7), a show lauded by public intellectuals and journalists alike (see Jenkins 1984, 
Thompson 1996, 59-74, Gitlin 2000). Binge-watching’s emergence is heavily associated with 
the circulation of HBO-style ‘quality’ TV dramas like The Sopranos (HBO, 1999-2005) and The 
Wire (HBO, 2002-8) on DVD.3 The investment of the ‘gatekeepers’ of high culture, such as 
journalists or academics, in valuing TV series as ‘high culture’ at times when new 
technologies and viewing practices emerge is indicative of the degree to which concepts of 
control and cultural value are connected (Newman and Levine 2012, 153-71). In other 
words, ‘good’ TV makes self-improvement possible, while the new technologies of control 
make manipulating the set so easy that there is no excuse for not seeking such programs 
out. The narratives of (individual) self-improvement linked to ancillary technologies of 
television often expose assumptions about how self-governance and freedom to determine 
television viewing through self-scheduling will lead to a ‘better’ form of entertainment. Yet, 
this also means that the individual has to take responsibility for the viewing of ‘bad’ 
television and its (assumed) consequences.  
Newman and Levine, discussing processes of legitimating television, outline different 
cycles in which art forms rose to a broader cultural appreciation over time. As examples 
they name jazz and film, initially associated, respectively, with African American and 
immigrant working class cultures in the US: 
 
Among the lessons from this history of art forms rising in status is the 
significance of class distinction in legitimating culture, separating higher 
from lower classes of consumers. One function of legitimation in these 
historical cases is to manage social change and class mobility, to secure the 
culture of an elite against the intrusion of undesirable masses, and thus to 
perpetuate the privilege of the dominant (2012, 9).  
 
Thus class, along with race and gender, is central to the construction of cultural value in 
relation to television. As part of neoliberal discourses, class is understood here in a 
Bourdieuian sense as both economic and cultural. Television studies and sociology often 
invoke Pierre Bourdieu’s work (2010) to conceptualise class distinctions within 
neoliberalism. His model describes a system in which the middle class retains cultural power 
even as neoliberalism works to erode its financial power (see, for example, Savage et al. 
2015, Harvey 2005). In this light, ‘good’ television is understood as reproducing values and 
aesthetic sensitivities of what, in this system, is depicted as ‘middle class.’ Thus, ‘good’ TV, 
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in cyclical logic, is both determined by and constitutive of a ‘middle class’ that is defined by 
cultural markers rather than money. However, lower pricing of ancillary technologies 
widens accessibility because more people with low incomes are able to afford them. At the 
same time, the price-point indicates increased competition, which often signals that a 
technology is easier to manage. Lower prices mean that more people are likely to buy the 
technology or, as in the case of remote controls, have them included with other 
technologies (TVs, Hi-Fi systems) without necessarily being interested in the technology as 
such. Whereas previous iterations may have only been available to technology (or 
television) aficionados, technology and associated practices are eventually ‘mainstreamed’ 
and integrated into everyday media practices. Thus, lower pricing is an indicator of wider 
availability across class spectrums, going beyond economic considerations of class. Yet, 
wider availability includes broad-scale adoption by such demographics as young people and 
the working class and the television texts that target them. This will be examined later in 
more detail with respect to the RCD. 
In relation to moral panics Julian Petley argues that concern for young people often 
serves to hide a disdain for the working class as supposedly similarly ‘uneducated’ and in 
need of guidance. As he writes,  
 
Debates about media effects tend to focus on how children and young 
people are supposedly affected – usually for the worse. But lurking behind 
these fears about the ‘corruption of innocent minds’ one finds, time and 
again, implicit or explicit, a potent strain of class dislike and fear (2000, 170). 
 
Thus, within the theories used to conceptualise moral panics, the concern about young 
people often goes along with a broader concern for ‘uneducated’ and often infantilized 
groups, such as the working class (see Murdock 2001). Though this article does not deal with 
a specific moral panic, it is useful to invoke the concepts used to analyse them to develop an 
understanding of how concern about societal groups serves to de-legitimise cultural 
movements, fashions, or media. Different groups with reduced cultural and societal power 
can stand in for each other when sharing markers, such as presumed levels of education or 
maturity. This is relevant here, as concerns about the medium of television arise frequently 
and moral panics emerge often in relation to programmes aimed at teenagers, as discussed 
later in relation to 13 Reasons Why (Netflix, 2017- ). Such outrage cannot be viewed 
separately from broader discourses surrounding class and the cultural legitimation of the 
medium. 
If the cultural status of a medium is thus linked to certain target audiences, then 
what kind of television they are watching is equally important:  
 
Legitimation is deeply invested in discourses of progress and improvement, 
and it works by elevation of one concept of television at the expense of 
another. For some kinds of television to be consecrated as art, other kinds 
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must be confirmed in inadequacy. New is elevated over old, active over 
passive, class over mass, masculine over feminine (Newman and Levine, 
2012, 5). 
 
Thus, as we shall see in more detail later, the technologies and practices of control are 
deeply enmeshed with an ideology of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ television. Ancillary technologies, 
along with discourses establishing ‘quality,’ help viewers to access ‘good’ and avoid ‘bad’ TV. 
Moreover, it is individual viewers, the subjects of neoliberalism, that potentially fail in their 
‘self-improvement,’ that let the broader system down by watching ‘bad’ television. Enabled 
through technology and ‘good’ television, the viewer still chooses to watch ‘bad’ TV and 
suffers the consequences (e.g., illness, anti-social behaviour or depreciation in the value of 
the neoliberal subject). Class distastes are rarely as elucidated as when considering this 
aspect as a cycle: technological innovation is followed by innovative programming that 
conforms to middle-class taste structures. Its wider accessibility (often through lower 
pricing) is then followed by a cultural denigration of the practice and the overall de-
legitimation of the medium.  
It is this idea of cultural value that I mean to trace by comparing channel-surfing and 
binge-watching. My article will focus on the discourses surrounding viewing practices, 
technologies and the cultural valuation of content in different eras. The purpose of this 
comparison is to trace cycles of legitimation and de-legitimation within the discourse of 
television. The legitimation and de-legitimation of television may be more easily understood 
as cyclical: as all new technologies and viewing practices become old, ‘good TV goes bad’ as 
a series in The Guardian puts it and, consequently, a legitimated medium becomes de-
legitimated.  
The scope of this article does not allow a close analysis of all the discourses at work 
to establish cultural value, including the way consensus among the ‘gatekeepers’ is 
established, often through agreement on a few ‘quality’ series. Such agreement becomes 
even more difficult in what Chairman of FX Network and Network Productions John 
Landgraf calls the era of ‘peak TV’ (see, for example, Press 2018). ‘Peak TV’ means that more 
television content, geared to smaller and smaller audience niches, is available than ever 
before. Further, services like Netflix have designed algorithms that recommend ‘peak-TV’ 
texts based on past viewing behaviour, meaning that audiences are less aware of texts that 
were not designed for them and people like them (see also Alexander 2016, Uricchio 2017, 
Finn 2017).  
To grasp the outlines of cycles of legitimation and de-legitimation, this article uses 
the terminology of TV I, II, III and IV to describe different eras or ‘phases’ of television, which 
are explained in more detail throughout. These are, to use Derek Kompare’s language (2005, 
199), reconceptions of television, periods when the idea of what television is changes (for 
more detailed discussion see Jenner 2018, 9-20). My focus here is on the linkage between 
technology and discourses surrounding control and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ TV with a particular 
emphasis on some of the discourses surrounding channel-surfing and binge-watching.  
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Practices of Control: Surfing Channels 
Channel-surfing becomes particularly common in the TV II era. TV II encompasses 
developments of the mid-to-late 1970s until the late 1990s. This period saw the 
introduction of technologies like the VCR, the broader availability of cable TV in the US and 
the introduction of these technologies in other countries. Remote controls were introduced 
earlier, but as Benson-Allott points out, they came with a high price tag and were often 
inaccurate (2015, 32-42).4 Infrared technology made them at once more accurate and 
cheaper to manufacture, and they were quickly included with a range of electronic devices 
from 1980 onwards (ibid., 81). The proliferation of channels that came with cable TV also 
made them necessary to navigate television. In this context, there were also massive 
changes to industry and television content (see, for example, Lotz 2018, Thompson 1997). 
Though few people would have acquired all of these new technologies at the same time, 
making shifts feel less radical than they actually were, it cannot be underestimated how 
much this period changed the cultural idea of what television is. These new technologies 
extended uses of the set and immensely increased viewer control.  
Urban Dictionary’s colloquial definition of channel-surfing in 2006 is instructive for 
cataloguing what the practice encompasses:  
 
The act of changing TV channels without finding a channel to stop on. 
Pressing the up or down button on the TV remote control while hoping to 
find something worth watching. This involuntary muscle reaction is triggered 
by the commercial. Sometimes the act of channel surfing becomes 
entertainment in and of itself ... For males of the species, it is possible 
simultaneously [to] watch two or three programs and still follow the weak 
attempt at a plot (RadioRay 2006). 
 
Some of the more contemporary views on watching scheduled television in an era when 
binge-watching on DVD box sets is possible are visible in this definition, while others are 
heavily influenced by popular culture depictions and gendered assumptions of the 1990s. 
The Urban Dictionary definition understands channel-surfing as an umbrella term that 
unites a variety of practices, such as grazing (sampling different channels until one is found), 
parallel viewing, and advertising avoidance (Bellamy and Walker 1993, 4), making it a more 
nuanced definition than those often offered by more ‘legitimate’ dictionaries. This definition 
also includes the idea that channel-surfing in itself can be entertainment, pointing to its 
status as an activity without a specific goal (finding a programme to watch) or purpose 
(following the narrative of that programme). In other words, this viewing practice can take 
place independently of any specific programmes that are watched. On the one hand, the 
physical mastery of waves implicit in the activity of channel-surfing is translated to the 
control of airwaves. This mastery implies the ability to ‘better’ oneself through disciplined 
television watching. On the other hand, channel-surfing is linked to cultural stereotypes 
such as the ‘couch potato,’ which suggests physical inactivity, even laziness, and thus the 
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opposite of what is suggested by the term. Hence, channel-surfing, and later binge-
watching, should be viewed as a complex intersection of contradictory discourses of 
‘quality’ television, technology and class.   
The TV II era saw a wave of ‘quality’ TV that Robert J. Thompson, in remarking on 
developments in TV from the late 1970s onwards, called the ‘Second Golden Age’ of 
television. He introduces a list of twelve characteristics of ‘quality’ TV in this era, which 
importantly includes the criterion that it attracts an audience of ‘upscale, well-educated, 
urban-dwelling young viewers’ (1996, 14). This suggests once again the role of class and 
cultural capital in discussions of television. ‘Quality’ TV of the era included Hill Street Blues, 
L.A. Law (NBC, 1986-94), Cagney & Lacey (CBS, 1981-8), thirtysomething (ABC, 1987-91), 
Moonlighting (ABC, 1985-9) and Miami Vice (NBC, 1984-90).5 As Thompson (1996, 59-74) 
and Steve Jenkins (1984) suggest, discourses on ‘quality’ television extended beyond 
television academics to encompass a range of cultural commentators, including journalists 
and other ‘gatekeepers’ that, for example, championed Hill Street Blues. John T. Caldwell 
argues that the 1980s saw a movement towards a unique television aesthetic he describes 
as ‘televisuality’ (1995). Caldwell himself does not engage with issues of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ TV, 
but his highlighting of an innovative, medium-specific, aesthetic form ultimately elevates 
‘televisuality’ to the level of art. Caldwell positions the stylistic innovation of the era as tied 
to the RCD:  
 
With the choice of over one hundred channels now coming to some cable 
markets, and five hundred on the horizon in others, consumers face 
immense viewing choices. ABC cites this factor, and the resulting tendency 
of viewers to endlessly zap channels [channel-surf], as the reason for the 
demise of television as aesthetic forms on television and for the viewers’ 
new lack of commitment. But this excuse is both short-sighted and 
revealing. If one views the emergence of excessive visuality as a 
counterstrategy by the industry, as I have argued, then stylistic extremes 
will continue as a way to fight viewer disinterest, channel grazing, and 
infinite choice – in short, will continue as a way of attracting and 
intensifying the spectator’s visual gaze (1995, Kindle location 4152-9, italics 
in the original). 
 
Thus, Caldwell positions RCDs and channel-surfing as among driving forces in the 
development of sophisticated television aesthetics.  
Within neoliberal narratives, the increased control given to viewers would ideally be 
used to ‘better’ oneself by watching ‘good’ television. Charlotte Brunsdon reflects on ‘good’ 
television in a British context when she writes:6 
 
Television (by implication, not itself good) becomes worthy when it brings to 
a wider audience already legitimated high- and middlebrow culture . . . So 
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we have ‘good television,’ so far, constructed across a range of oppositions 
which condense colonial histories, the organizing and financing of 
broadcasting institutions, and the relegitimation of already legitimate artistic 
processes (1990, 59-60). 
 
Here Brunsdon states that the most common euphemism for ‘bad’ television since the mid-
1970s was ‘American television.’ This judgment, of course, is difficult to adapt to an 
American context, but terms like ‘popular’ television that imply that a programme is widely 
watched still ring true. Ien Ang points to the American-ness of Dallas (CBS, 1978-91) and 
discourses in the Netherlands that highlighted the way it promotes American neoliberal 
ideologies as ‘bad’ television (1985, 55-6). The British context, with its separation into Public 
Service Broadcasting and commercial television (primarily funded through advertising) is 
instructive in identifying the ‘ultimate bad television’: commercials. As Bret Maxwell 
Dawson (2008, 44-102) points out, marketing discourses for the RCD in the 1950s 
emphasised its ability to mute advertisements or change channels to avoid them. In fact, 
Zenith’s founder Eugene F. McDonald Jr. criticised the American commercial media system 
and pointed to the remote control as a means of avoiding advertising and thus ‘bad’ 
television. Though much of this kind of commentary envisions advertising as mainly a 
nuisance, the publication of Vance Packard’s The Hidden Persuaders in 1957 explicitly 
positions it (in all media) as a strategy of brainwashing or mind-control. Thus, 1950s 
discourse depicts advertising on television as not just ‘bad’ because it disrupts programming 
or detracts from aesthetic and narrative quality, but also because it has ill effects on 
audiences. Remote controls were initially sold as a strategy to ‘repair’ television (to borrow 
Dawson’s terminology) by offering viewers the opportunity to avoid advertising and thus 
‘bad’ television with its destructive influences (Dawson 2008, 44-102). This attitude 
pervades all eras of television history.7 E. Graham McKinley (1996), in her research on girls’ 
and young women’s viewing of Beverly Hills 90210 (Fox, 1990-2000) argues for the series’ 
potential ‘bad’ effects on viewers who fail to question its foundations in patriarchal 
ideologies.  
Less concerned with media effects and more with value judgements made by 
viewers, Brunsdon addresses the negative judgements about programmes explicitly directed 
at women, particularly soap operas (1997, 9-11). Ann Gray also finds this in her research on 
British women’s use of VCRs when asking about judgements of ‘quality’ about a programme 
(1992, 49-78). Several of her interview subjects seem ashamed of enjoying texts like Dallas 
and Dynasty (ABC, 1981-9). We can see here that concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ TV are tied to 
issues of class and gender.8 Discourses surrounding ‘good’ and ‘bad’ television help viewers 
exercise control and (potentially) accumulate cultural capital in the TV II era. In other words, 
these discourses help police the boundaries of what should and should not be watched. This 
is particularly important in times when technological shifts linked to cable and the RCD 
make it easier for viewers to channel-surf and make choices about what to watch.  
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Considering the vast extension of choice through cable and additional network 
channels throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it is perhaps unsurprising that channel-surfing’s 
linkage to ideas of an empowered, self-scheduling viewer who will not be lured by ‘bad’ 
television are soon supplanted by narratives of the ‘couch potato.’ This term was 
trademarked by cartoonist Robert Armstrong, who claims to have come up with it in 1976 in 
the US (Scott 2016). ‘Couch potato’ did not always have a negative connotation. Yet, it is not 
until 1987 that the New York Times reports on a range of events as well as a comic book and 
board games that ironically capitalise on the term. The ironic self-awareness of Yuppies and 
their viewing of Moonlighting, part of the ‘quality’ TV of the era, in New York’s fashionable 
clubs still signals positive connotations of the terminology (‘Home & Garden Editorial,’ New 
York Times, 1987). At the same time, this positive outlook would be supplanted by wider 
cultural anxieties surrounding groups with considerably less cultural and economic capital: 
young people and the working class. To a certain extent, the idea of the couch potato may 
be the most significant indicator of the way the technology and practices of control become 
reformulated to express some of the worst fears linked to television: laziness, apathy, and 
the emergence of health issues. It is TV itself in the late 1980s and 1990s that promotes 
some of the class distaste inherent in this anxiety through its depiction of working-class men 
such as Al Bundy (Ed O’Neil) in Married ... With Children (Fox, 1986-97) or Dan Connor (John 
Goodman) in Roseanne (ABC, 1988-97). Both characters are intended as parodies of this 
type, but the blank expression in Bundy’s face, one hand in his trousers, as he flips through 
TV channels in the opening credits of Married ... With Children, is designed to criticise 
stereotypes of working-class masculinity, not television viewing or the stereotype of the 
‘couch potato.’ Bundy is a character who routinely alienates his middle-class neighbours 
(and, supposedly, middle-class viewers) through overly stereotypical behaviour, such as 
exaggerated misogyny or ignorance in a way that suggests irony. Meanwhile, though his 
pose may be taken as part of this ironic exaggeration, it is never questioned that television 
viewing is part of his ‘bad’ behaviour, as his blank stare suggests it could not have any other 
effects. Through his television viewing Bundy, possibly more than other television 
characters, shows the way television is de-legitimated in the TV II era.  
Thus, channel-surfing, with its connotations of activity and discipline and its potential 
for ‘better’ television viewing of ‘better’ television becomes an increasingly maligned 
practice in discourses on television. At the very least, from marketing discourses of the 
1950s to ‘quality’ TV discourses of the 1980s, channel-surfing complicates discourses of 
empowerment, ‘quality’ TV, and medium legitimation.  
 
Practices of Control: Binge-ing Television 
With respect to channel-surfing, binge-watching manifests a different relationship between 
practice and technology. In fact, binge-watching is not uniquely tied to a specific technology 
or formation of technologies that occurred at the same time. Binge-watching emerged 
largely in relation to DVD box sets in the early 2000s, though VCRs and some sell-through 
VHS tapes of TV series make it very likely that it was not an uncommon practice previously 
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among fans.9 Even now, when online streaming has made this form of viewing easier and 
more prevalent, it is tied to different platforms in distinct ways that are dependent on 
interface structures and marketing. That said, Netflix in particular has claimed the term to 
describe viewing on its platform in a way that no individual media company has ever 
incorporated channel-surfing into its own branding. Furthermore, just as the RCD became 
more accessible to audiences in the TV II era, Netflix has made binge-watching more widely 
accessible in the TV IV era through its user-friendly interface and the affordability of its 
service. Accordingly, my focus here is on binge-watching in relation to Netflix rather than 
television in the TV IV era in general. Yet, this does not mean that binge-watching’s history 
and wide emergence in the era of TV III ‘quality’ TV is not important, as this highlights some 
discursive linkages between binge-watching, control, class and neoliberalism, as discussed in 
this section. Like channel-surfing, the practice of binge-watching is embedded in a number 
of technological and industrial processes as television becomes reconceptualised as what is, 
essentially, an online medium in the current TV IV era. The fact that VOD (Video-on-
Demand) allows television content to be consumed away from the television set has made 
controlling it a different experience, contributing to a shift in the viewer-content 
relationship that can be summarised under the term binge-watching. Both channel-surfing 
and binge-watching have been associated in popular discourse with loss of control. Unlike 
channel-surfing, binge-watching already connotes the idea of losing control. However, as we 
shall see, the parameters in which control is lost are neatly defined and policed via 
discourses of ‘quality.’  
The definition of binge-watching I adopt here means the watching of several 
episodes of a serialised programme consecutively on a medium other than broadcast 
television. This does not imply a specific number of episodes that need to be watched in one 
sitting, but it does mean that only one serialised programme is watched at a time (unlike 
traditional schedules where one programme is followed by the next) and that the pace of 
viewing is determined by the viewer, not the broadcaster. The kind of narrative that was 
originally considered to benefit from this level of control was the twelve-episode-per-season 
‘quality’ drama that became common for US cable channels in the early 2000s as part of the 
TV III era. The loss of control implied here is in the narrative, not the medium. Unlike 
channel-surfing, which routinely disrupts the programme through grazing, parallel viewing, 
or advertising avoidance, binge-watching is predicated on having found a programme, while 
the activity describes following the narrative of that programme beyond the individual 
episode without disruption. To use Jason Jacobs’ (2011) language, where channel-surfing is 
based on the idea of a ‘polluted’ text interrupted by advertising, previews or idents, binge-
watching means indulgence in an uninterrupted ‘pure’ text.  
Another parameter of how the ‘loss’ of control implied in binge-watching is policed 
lies in the technology. Binge-watching on DVD or SVOD implies a way of consuming 
television that actively seeks to subvert the schedule and the commercial, much like 
channel-surfing originally did. As Newman and Levine argue, this is supported by a range of 
technologies: ‘The introduction of TV shows on DVD and the TiVo and Replay TV digital 
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video recorders, along with HDTV and digital sources of content, changed the ways many 
viewers watched television’ (2012, 4). The digital technologies of television, including 
Netflix, imply alternative ways of presenting and ordering content than that of the 
broadcasting schedule RCDs allowed viewers to subvert. In fact, much of the control 
exercised in relation to binge-watching lies in the fact that the broadcasting schedule no 
longer dictates when and where specific programmes are available to view.10 Because of 
this, the idea of binge-watching that Netflix capitalises on links it neatly with previous 
ancillary technologies. Netflix appears to pride itself on not having a schedule – a language 
that seeks to hide the fact that it still structures viewing in significant ways, even if these 
structures are not as prescriptive as more traditional strategies of scheduling (see Jenner 
2018, 119-37). What Lisa Perks refers to as ‘insulated flow’ (2015, xxvi) describes an 
important part of such structures. Netflix promotes insulated flow via the post-play 
function, which automatically starts the next episode after one has finished and thus 
privileges the sequential viewing of a single text rather than the viewing of different texts in 
succession as is custom on traditional broadcasting schedules. More recently, Netflix also 
introduced the ‘skip intro’ button, which enables viewers to skip opening credits, 
heightening the importance of a continuous narrative arc over separation into individual 
episodes. Thus, Netflix highlights insulated flow and suggests sequential binge-watching for 
any texts (even those from the TV I or TV II era). At the same time, insulated flow is 
associated with the idea of the ‘pure text,’ a text that is uninterrupted by commercials – the 
embodiment of ‘bad television.’11 This idea of the ‘pure’ text of ‘quality’ television initially 
serves to dictate some parameters of the loss of control implicit in binge-watching.  
The self-scheduling implicit in binge-watching, wherein audiences are expected to 
binge-watch at times convenient for them to get ‘lost,’ for example during holidays (see 
Perks 2015, 15-38), represents another parameter of the loss of control. Self-scheduling 
implies that viewers binge-watch carefully selected texts that allow for an immersive 
viewing experience, rather than watching whatever is on TV, as implied in channel-surfing 
and the dependence on the broadcasting schedule. This kind of control over what-is- 
watched-when may be best expressed through Perks’ favoured term media marathoning. 
For her, marathoning includes a sense of accomplishment after having completed an 
extended exercise. The parallels of athleticism and control with channel-surfing are obvious 
and highlight the control expected of viewers. Perks emphasises the importance of control 
when she argues: ‘By controlling the pace of the narrative journey and focusing on one story 
world, marathoners can maximize the emotional and cognitive rewards of their media 
experience’ (2015, xi). Thus, the control over scheduling is key in earning personal rewards. 
Controlling when to binge-watch and what to watch allows viewers to ensure maximum 
rewards can be gained from the experience.  
Thus, binge-watching implies a ‘controlled’ or planned loss of control in the ‘pure’ 
text of ‘quality’ TV. This loss of control is, however, heavily policed by a number of 
discourses: concepts of ‘quality’ television, issues of technology that make watching the 
‘pure’ text of ‘quality’ television possible and desirable, and the overall subversion of the 
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schedule of broadcast television. Such factors thus setting binge-watching apart from what 
is commonly understood as television.  
The reason Netflix plays such an important role in the phenomenon of binge-
watching lies not only in its structure or current market dominance, but also in how 
affordable and accessible it has made this mode of viewing. Initially binge-watching was 
linked to financial and, more importantly, cultural capital, remaining accessible only to those 
who could afford (in terms of money and leisure time) to own these technologies and the 
box sets and were committed enough to media to do so. Now, journalists and scholars in 
the US, where cable access is relatively expensive, have noted the phenomenon of ‘cord-
cutting’: 
 
Among the television industry’s biggest fears is the phenomenon known as 
cord-cutting (also called cable-cutting). Cord-cutting refers to individuals 
cancelling cable television subscriptions and turning to ‘over-the-top’ 
services such as Netflix, Hulu, Boxee, iTunes, and YouTube, free over-the-air 
television, or simply pirating all their entertainment needs off the Internet 
(Strangelove 2015, 94). 
 
Though this phenomenon has gained more traction since Michael Strangelove’s book was 
published, both in the US and elsewhere (O’Halloran 2018), it is still difficult to foresee how 
much online TV will replace other technologies. Lotz’s industry focus leads her to quickly 
dismiss any panic over the practice (2018, Kindle location 3665-72). Yet, as much as cord-
cutting may not be a major concern for the industry, it is still relevant in other contexts.  
As Strangelove notes, ‘Pay-television may only cost 30¢ an hour, but it still costs 
$900 or more a year. That is a large pile of cash to a family struggling to meet mortgage 
payments’ (2015, 96). Inherent in the principle of cord-cutting is online access at lower 
prices for viewers in light of the fact that such access is a necessary expense for many of 
them. The idea of cord-cutting, however, is not only economic in its implications either for 
the industry or viewers, but also has cultural ramifications. Because of this, the popular 
debate around it cannot be dismissed, as it signals ideological shifts in cultural 
understandings of what television is and should be. Strangelove describes cord-cutting as a 
time-intensive and complicated process to find and access texts via different legal and illegal 
means on a variety of platforms (ibid. 102-3). Netflix makes this process significantly easier 
through its sophisticated recommendation algorithm and by allowing viewers enhanced 
control over their own schedule at a comparatively low price. In a country like the US, where 
broadband internet and devices to stream content are widely available and accessible, 
Netflix and other platforms in this way offer a serious alternative to linear cable television. 
Cord-cutting as a cultural phenomenon encapsulates the accessibility of streaming and its 
viability as an alternative to broadcast television. Considering how extensively Netflix’s 
branding is associated with binge-watching, its affordable pricing makes it more accessible 
to ‘the masses,’ including those who have no time to scour the internet for ‘good’ TV to 
Volume 16, Issue 2 
                                        November 2019 
 
Page 311 
 
watch. Wider access – somewhat inevitably – makes the parameters of the loss of control 
implied in binge-watching more difficult to control. In other words, it becomes more difficult 
to police what is watched and when.  
In the middle of a broad debate on ‘quality’ TV and the cinematization of television, 
Brunsdon’s 2010 analysis of binge-watching highlights the contradiction at its centre: 
 
The sequestered autonomy of binge viewing, the implied squandering of 
time and money, points to a paradox at the heart of the new, valorized ‘not 
television’ DVD television ... Despite the valorization within traditional 
aesthetic discourse, there is, in this metaphor of bingeing, the trace of a 
persistent cultural shame at absorption in an audio-visual, fictional world 
(2010, Kindle location 1649). 
 
In other words, in times when the cultural debate about binge-watching is dominated by its 
linkage with ‘good’, even ‘quality’ TV, the term itself already suggests a means of medium 
de-legitimation, with ‘cultural shame’ becoming, of course, more pronounced when the 
consumed text is less valorised within cultural discourse. Yet, this may only indicate 
a(nother) shift in the paradigms of defining ‘good’ TV.  
 The debate surrounding 13 Reasons Why is significant to understanding how debates 
surrounding binge-watching and its links with ‘quality’ TV have shifted: with its sophisticated 
narrative structure, cinematic aesthetics, and serious subject matter (sexual assault and 
teen suicide) at least the first season of the series would have been easily considered ‘good,’ 
even ‘quality’ TV in the first decade of the 2000s. Later, however, the debate surrounding it 
draws together ideas of binge-watching, privileged modes of viewing promulgated by 
Netflix, and the series’ supposedly ‘bad’ effects on teen audiences (see Proctor 2017), as 
discussed in more detail by Tanya Horeck (2019) in this issue. While the debates may not 
directly address the question of whether 13 Reasons Why is ‘bad’ TV, they clearly identify 
the show with the effects of ‘bad’ TV – effects that lead in this case to anxiety, depression, 
re-traumatization, and even imitation of the suicide depicted on screen (Allem 2017). This 
implies a resurgence of television as de-legitimated medium with ‘bad’ effects on young 
audiences and possibly even other ‘undereducated’ or ‘uneducated’ groups, such as 
working-class viewers. In much of this media coverage, the practice of binge-watching is 
being maligned, then, not the ‘quality’ of the text itself. Following the formal conventions of 
‘quality’ television, 13 Reasons Why stands out, largely because those with similar cultural 
capital as the ‘gatekeepers’ of culture may find it among their recommendations while they 
may never notice Netflix’s more ‘low-brow’ in-house productions, such as the Ashton 
Kutcher-led sitcom The Ranch (Netflix, 2016-). The outrage about 13 Reasons Why is 
important because it signals a broader discomfort with the platforms and culture of binge-
watching, while contextualising Guy Pearce’s statements as recounted in the beginning of 
this article.  
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Controlled Television? 
In 1987, John Fiske discussed the ‘semiotic excess’ of television. He means the excess of 
meanings in a short scene in the TV series Hart to Hart (ABC, 1979-84). This indicates just 
how excessive the meanings across the entire medium must be. The technologies of control 
and the practices associated with them offer a way to manage this excess and, thus, the 
possibility of managing the meanings of television. Supposedly, then, viewers can 
counteract the assumed negative meanings and effects of television and only receive the 
‘good’ meanings, pleasures, and effects by exercising self-discipline.  
Yet, as we have seen, some contradictions are central to this assumption. The pricing 
of remote controls provides a sense of how much these practices become troubling at the 
moment when access is significantly widened to include the (supposedly) ‘uneducated.’ 
Meanwhile, binge-watching implies little power for the viewer to disrupt the text. In fact, 
the implicit assumption is that viewers will watch the ‘pure text’ with as little interruption as 
possible: Netflix even offers viewers the possibility of skipping the opening credits, further 
‘purifying’ the text of commercial signifiers. Though the goal of the practice is clearly 
defined here (following the narrative to its conclusion), the practice seems to have proven 
increasingly troubling. Concern about binge-watching is framed by a concern for young 
people, presumably not mature or ‘educated’ enough to deal with challenging material, as 
in the case of 13 Reasons Why. The concern about youth audiences has historically served to 
imply wider anxieties about the effect of media on the ‘uneducated’ more broadly (Petley 
2001). As much as the personalization algorithm makes it difficult for the (often white, 
middle-class, male) ‘gatekeepers’ of culture to gauge the full extent of ‘bad’ TV on Netflix, 
the concern about 13 Reasons Why indicates a broader discomfort with the medium, its 
viewers, and viewing practices. One moral panic may not indicate a wider de-legitimation of 
the medium of television. In fact, the outrage over 13 Reasons Why refers to one text on 
one platform. Yet, the disregard of the ‘quality’ TV aspects of the series point to a broader 
disenchantment that may very well affect other texts and platforms that rely on binge-
watching and its ‘quality’ TV connotations in the future. At the very least, it appears to 
influence the speculation over Netflix’s company policy mentioned in Pearce’s statements 
on binge-watching. If the history of channel-surfing is any indication, the de-legitimation of 
binge-watching and television may be imminent – even though the conditions of algorithmic 
culture mean that this de-legitimation will likely look very different than that in the TV II era.  
Overall, this article has emphasised how channel-surfing and binge-watching bring 
together various discourses of technology, viewing practices, and content in order to tie 
television and television viewing to neoliberal discourses of self-improvement. Most 
significantly, television and its ancillary technologies hold the promise of self-improvement 
and appreciation in valuing the self through cultural capital. In other words, the ‘re-
education’ of the audience through streaming fits well with broader neoliberal culture. Yet, 
the ability to ‘self-improve’ through television is premised on the viewer’s ability and desire 
to seek out ‘good’ TV. These discourses of ‘good’ TV explain the valorisation of new 
technologies and viewing practices. Yet, somewhat inevitably, wider access makes it difficult 
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for viewers and technologies to fulfil this potential, leading ultimately to the de-legitimation 
of technology, viewing practice, and even the medium itself within the context of 
neoliberalism.  
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Notes: 
                                                          
1 Earlier versions, such as the Telezoom, had different functions (Benson-Allott 2015, 32). 
2 Netflix announced a price hike for North America and large parts of Latin America in January 2018, 
but the price of a Netflix subscription remains below that of cable subscriptions.  
3 As an example of the hyperbole that surrounds these series, Vice journalist Jesse Pearson describes 
The Wire as a ‘A FUCKING GOD’ (2010). The Sopranos is usually credited as ringing in a new era of 
‘quality’ TV, or, as David Stubbs puts it in The Guardian: 
A new mode of binge, longform consumption. This was a new mode of television, 
one which showed [that] the medium was capable of exceeding cinema. The 
Sopranos concluded 10 years ago this week, but its legacy in making the so-called 
small screen huge is permanent. (Stubbs 2017) 
4 As Benson-Allott argues of the early remote control: 
It added $30 to the price of any Zenith television set at a time when sets ranged in 
price between $269 and $629. It could also be purchased separately and installed by 
a handy homeowner or television repairman. $30 in 1950 is equivalent to nearly 
$300 today, though, so the Lazy Bones remote still represented an extravagant 
expense for middle-class consumers (2015, 33). 
5 As a further example, Jane Feuer, Paul Kerr and Tise Vahimagi name their 1984 edited collection on 
the production company MTM MTM: ‘Quality Television,’ highlighting discourses of ‘good’ television 
6 Brunsdon’s work on ‘good’ television is rooted within feminist frameworks and the exploration of 
soap operas within women’s lives (1997, 2000). This is not the approach taken here, though its 
usefulness cannot be doubted.  
7 An exception to this is Caldwell, whose – somewhat polemical – positive attitude to television 
aesthetics leads him to describe advertising as ‘the stylistic avant-garde of television’ (1995, Kindle 
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location 4152), pointing to the aesthetic value of advertising without commenting its assumed 
effects. What does this mean? 
8 Gray’s research focuses on women from different class backgrounds, though it is particularly 
educated, middle-class women who express these kinds of cultural judgements. 
9 Not many TV series were available on VHS tapes, however, anecdotal evidence suggests that series 
like Friends (NBC, 1994-2004) or The X-Files proved profitable in this format (at least profitable 
enough to allow for publication in the UK and Germany).  
10 Other mechanisms and practices, however, do dictate this. Broadcasters – whether platforms or 
linear broadcasters – still make the decisions on when, where, and what is available through 
publication schedules, availability of translation, geo-blocking or available apps, to name just a few, 
but more leeway is currently given to audiences than previously possible.  
11 The structure of inserting trailers between episodes, as was common for Amazon, was trialled in 
the US, but met with vast outcry by audiences, so the future of this strategy is currently unknown.  
